Is Twitter “bad”? Does it destroy your ability to concentrate, immerse you in ideas you are only half-interested in, condemning you to an intellectually impoverished lifetime of skimming and linking? This is clearly a danger for some people. But obviously life is more complex than a stark, either-or choice.

So I don’t understand why George Packer insists that Twitter is a pernicious, totalizing force in the media landscape, something that by its very nature swallows minds whole – as opposed to simply another tool, if a potentially distracting one. Some of the issues he raises in his two posts are real ones we all grapple with – how does swimming in a stream of constantly updating information from social media affect your concentration, your ability to manipulate ideas, to create?

But the online debate that he kicked off quickly devolved into silliness. Because Packer merely raises that question in order to tell us what he already thinks he knows. He doesn’t engage it directly or explore its facets, its history, its social effects. He is apparently unwilling to use his awesome journalism talents, so expertly deployed in understanding complex, layered, unfolding situations in Iraq or elsewhere around the world, on what’s right in front of his face.

The problem here isn’t Twitter. Or Packer’s resistance to technological change, or to shifting patterns of media consumption and expression (which I believe is misplaced, but he can do whatever he likes on that front). It’s the odd, elegiac pose he takes. Packer’s principal worry is that a world devoted to the quiet contemplation of books is ending:

Just about everyone I know complains about the same thing when they’re being honest—including, maybe especially, people whose business is reading and writing. They mourn the loss of books and the loss of time for books. It’s no less true of me, which is why I’m trying to place a few limits on the flood of information that I allow into my head. The other day I had to books that my son had wantonly pulled down, most of them volumes from college days. I thumbed idly through a few urgently underlined pages of Kierkegaard’s “Concluding Unscientific Postscript,” a book that electrified me during my junior year, and began to experience something like the sensation middle-aged men have at the start of softball season, when they try sprinting to first base after a winter off. What a ridiculous effort it took!

But the problems Packer cites, from his own observations, have little to do with books, or reading, or the content of your Twitter stream. It’s random social media stuff that rubs him the wrong way. He expresses revulsion at the sight of people reading their during lunch conversations, or pressing their noses to their smartphones as they stroll into traffic. He bemoans the end of the print-media business model and blames Twitter.

In other words, this is not a serious argument about the future of media. (A sure sign of this is to denounce your critics as members of an “intolerant cult,” compare social media to Thalidomide, and, stripping the irony from Roland Hedley – mon dieu! – equate Twitter and thanatos.) Maybe we shouldn’t expect a thoughtful argument in what was, originally, just a rant on a blog, albeit the New Yorker’s. But of course if you use the New Yorker platform to attack Twitter and the media revolution, it’s going to attract attention and debate. So I wish he’d have devoted some thought to this.

Packer pines for the way things used to be. But were things really so great before social media fractured our attention? Trashy entertainments and distractions are as old as culture itself. There may be more avenues for trash and trivia today, and more ways to waste time, but the obsessions haven’t changed. The question is, is this a difference of degree or kind? If you say “kind,” what are the implications for reading, for writing, for neurology? For news, for politics? Can they really be all bad? If they aren’t all bad, where does the promise lie for the long forms and deep thoughts that Packer seeks?

Culture has existed for thousands of years and (one hopes) will exist for thousands or millions more. The avenues for cultural expression are always changing. New forms emerge with new technology and social and economic changes. Triviality contends with depth. Neither wins, ultimately. It’s fine to mourn the past, but if you simply dig in and cling to your grief, it helps no one.

Why have the media been so reluctant to acknowledge Iraqi PM Maliki’s all-but endorsement of Obama’s Iraq plans? Only today, after three days of faux-controversy, are they getting it right.

There’s the standard left-blogosphere explanation, which I think is pretty accurate: the media grant more credibility to Republicans in general and John McCain in particular on matters of foreign policy and terrorism. Obama’s margin for error on these things with the press is razor-thin. McCain, meanwhile, can get basic world geography wrong and still get a pass. (For the record, I don’t think McCain’s verbal miscues merit a feeding frenzy – nor should Obama’s.) 

This double standard iis a deeply ingrained habit. It dates in its current form back to the 1980s, but really all the way back to Nixon. In the minds of the media, the principal political legacy of Nixon and Reagan, and to a lesser extent Bush 41 (who lost due to a sour economy), is the iron linkage between Republicans, an attitude of American “strength,” a policy of interventionism abroad, and victory at the ballot box.

But during the past eight years, the practice of projecting “strength” in foreign policy changed. Instead of a single, rather amorphous feature of the president’s foreign policy, “attitude” became nearly the whole damn thing.

Meanwhile, the quality of our foreign policy as policy – that is, government decisions taken with some intelligible long-term strategy in mind, some understanding of the world – declined precipitously. Nixon, Reagan, and Bush 41 (and while we’re at it, Ford, Carter, and Clinton) had their failings, but all ended up conducting foreign policies that look pretty good compared with what we’ve got now.

This is pretty obvious, and more an objective truth than any presumed correlation between bluster and winning elections. The public has recognized it: we’re in a ditch. But in covering Obama and McCain, the media still behave as if the various strategic blunders of past eight years never happened. This requires making a value judgment, which the media can’t, and won’t, do. So it’s very hard for them to credit Obama for foreign policy insight, even when – especially when – events align rather well with his policies.

The other driver here is fear. Political journalism is basically 25 percent facts and 75 percent interpretation and speculation. (Which is why it’s stupid.) There is a great premium placed on seeming “out in front” of the pack in interpreting events – but not too far out, in case the pack starts moving in a different direction. And in terms of crowd dynamics, traditional media outlets revere nothing more than their sometime foes in the conservative media. Drudge, Fox, Rush Limbaugh and the rest have the ability to spontaneously (or not-so spontaneously) align on a particular topic, creating the illusion of a populist wave. The MSM bought the Karl Rove view, mistaking this narrow intensity for broad, popular sentiment. They envy it. Consciously or not, they hew to its conventions. To give Obama too much credit on foreign policy risks a mocking, pseudo-popular backlash from the conservative media – based on some minor Obama gaffe, say (as Jon Stewart so artfully lampooned last night) – that spills over into the mainstream.

It’s all the stranger because what’s coming out of Iraq is great news not just for Obama, but for the United States. Look at the Bush administration’s ridiculous fumbling over Maliki’s statements. Take Obama out of the picture: from the standpoint of U.S. Iraq policy, this is a very positive development. Things are stabilizing to the point where we can talk about withdrawal. Bush did something right! Holy crap! But the White House is so heavily invested in … making Obama look bad? Military bases forever? … that it cannot acknowledge even its own apparent success. In other words, the stated aims of U.S. policy and the actual aims are not the same, and the contradiction is tying us in knots. Alas, the media haven’t noticed this obvious tension either.

The McCain campaign’s mounting incoherence – born of the candidate’s attempts to straddle the political center and the right, and of his apparent ignorance of the content of his own proposals – is a sight to behold.

Just in the past few days, there’s been a drumbeat of contradictory messages. McCain pledged to balance the budget by the end of his first term, but provided no details for what is a politically impossible task right now – one made all the more so by his proposed tax cuts and increases in defense spending

Then McCain denounced the pay-as-you go element of Social Security, in which today’s taxpayers pay the benefits of today’s retirees, as an “absolute disgrace.” It’s not clear why he said this – of course, if you have rising numbers of retirees and relatively few taxpayers, it’s a problem. But a “disgrace”? This is, after all, the way the program was designed and has operated for 70-plus years. The campaign’s explanation – the “disgrace” is the failure to address the coming shortfall – doesn’t really make sense. So we’re left with the impression, justified or not, that McCain somehow questions the rationale behind Social Seucirty itself.

Now, McCain’s staffers are apparently telegraphing the idea that he will abandon cap-and-trade as his big fix for climate change. This is probably wishful thinking on the part of conservatives. But still – this is the centerpiece of McCain’s climate policy. Or is it? (Update: It still is.)

McCain’s position on Iraq also got muddled on the question of whether we will be maintaining bases in a peaceful Iraq for decades to come, or leaving much sooner at the behest of the Iraqi government.

Presidential campaigns are always semi-improvisational – they can’t just rely on position papers, and must respond to changes in the world and the political environment. But this goes well beyond semi – these are not intelligent or even opportunistic adjustments to events, but random, chaotic changes. This isn’t jazz, it’s noise. There seems to be some fundamental confusion about what McCain’s policies are or should be, and also about his underlying principles. On a practical level, you never know precisely how a candidate’s positions will be translated into actual policy – but you can get some general ideas. That doesn’t seem to be the case here. We don’t know what McCain would actually do if he becomes president. And at least right now, neither does he.

This is a cogent takedown of Fred Hiatt’s much remarked-upon piece attacking the notion that “Bush lied” in the runup to the Iraq war. I sort-of agree with Hiatt that the whole “Bush lied” idea is simplistic. But it’s all about how you frame the argument. If we take a narrow definition of “lying” as knowingly uttering an untruth, then it’s hard to nail Bush, given the predominant opinion of the intelligence community was that Saddam did have various WMD stockpiles somewhere. You might be able to nail Cheney, who said on Meet the Press that “we believe he has, in fact, reconstituted nuclear weapons.” Six months later, Tim Russert got Cheney to walk it back:

MR. RUSSERT: Reconstituted nuclear weapons. You misspoke.

VICE PRES. CHENEY: Yeah. I did misspeak. I said repeatedly during the show weapons capability. We never had any evidence that he had acquired a nuclear weapon.

You can see how using the narrow definition of lying reduces this question to a set of circular arguments about the degree of dissembling in individual statements, or legalistic shadings of the meaning of “lying.” Which, as Yglesias points out, is to ignore what actually happened. What Bush & Co. did was what presidential administrations do all the time in political campaigns and on domestic policy – take a set of at-best muddled and contradictory information about a problem, then exaggerate and misrepresent it to create the appearance of great urgency. The innovation, such as it was, was to apply these ham-fisted techniques to matters of war and statecraft, with lives and America’s strategic interests on the line. That it didn’t work out so well is one of the great cautionary tales of our era: there are some lines presidents shouldn’t cross in communicating with the masses. To deny this now, as Hiatt does, and instead maintain the Iraq invasion was a reasonable response to the facts as known at the time doesn’t make much sense.

It’s hard to see how John McCain’s speech yesterday – saying that we may be able to pull out of Iraq at the end of his first term because peace and prosperity will reign there and in the U.S. thanks to his (currently quite threadbare) policies – does much for him.

It comes off as a strange mixture of silliness and arrogance to predict so specifically what your accomplishments will be four years down the road. But it also muddies the waters on Iraq in ways disadvantageous to McCain’s candidacy. He presumably is trying to back away from his “100 years” statement and reassure the majority of Americans fed up with the Iraq war that yes, he’d like to get (mostly) out after all. But his previous position at least had the advantage of simplicity, and could be defended on those grounds – don’t pull out until we achieve “victory.” However ill-defined victory may be, it’s clear we aren’t winning now and that there are dangers to leaving.

But “maybe out by 2013″ sounds either like an out-and-out pander or a fantasy. The non-deadline deadline is a transparent attempt to have it both ways. So it’s unlikely to win over Iraq skeptics, and may alienate war supporters.

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