Barge sits in Lower 9th Ward, December 2005

Barge sits in Lower 9th Ward, December 2005

The fourth anniversary of Hurricane Katrina is upon us, and New Orleans continues to slowly rebound, with a smaller footprint than before but abundant community spirit. But, alarmingly, its long-term predicament remains unchanged, and the opportunity the nation had to confront it has been mostly squandered.

I refer, of course, to the challenge of protecting the city and surrounding coastlines from hurricanes. Three centuries of experience have proven time after time this is a deadly serious risk. And time after time, various government agencies – from New Orleans’s earliest colonial administrations to the Obama White House – have responded in a haphazard fashion, doing just enough to make people feel safe again, but not enough to prevent the next big disaster.

The Katrina disaster was deeply ironic. Turns out America, the nation that tamed rivers and the continent, won World War II and emerged as the globe’s lone superpower, couldn’t build a floodwall. America, the nation of the mass media and instantaneous communication, couldn’t figure out where the New Orleans Convention Center was, or deliver food and water a few blocks to the thousands of people gathered there. Post-K, there was reason to believe these outrages might force a reassessment of how the nation handles not just emergency response – what you do after disaster strikes – but prevention. The rapidly-eroding Louisiana coast seems like an outlier, but this is deceptive – climate change is going to raise the risks not just for coastlines (higher sea levels and – possibly – stronger storms) but for any area where rapid environmental shifts take place and communities built for yesterday’s conditions suddenly find themselves under water, consumed by fire or afflicted by drought or other problems. New Orleans is, in this sense, an important test case.

But no such reassessment took place. Instead, the same institution that screwed this up the first time – the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, was put in charge of the effort to protect New Orleans and the surrounding coastline. This was crazy and irresponsible, and the results were predictable. The Corps is building a $14 billion stopgap levee system, an upgrade to the old one that is certainly better than what was there before, but not nearly enough to protect the city from a Category 5 hurricane storm surge.

The Corps has been studying the options for bigger and better protection, and how to integrate it with efforts to restore the rapidly-eroding marshlands of south Louisiana, for four years. This is an ambitious project, and (in my view) an essential one. It should have been fast-tracked. It should have gotten some stimulus money. Instead it bogged down. . But there’s nobody really calling the shots at the upper levels of government. It’s not a national priority. President Obama says it is, and is creating a task force that may cut through some of the seemingly hopeless skein of red tape. So, we’ll see. But given the fiscal and political pressures on the Obama administration and the severe bureaucratic inertia holding this thing back (which results from basic power arrangements between Congress, the Corps, and successive administrations) I’m skeptical.

This is human nature, you might say, the way government institutions work. We’re always preparing for the last disaster. We don’t anticipate the “black swans.” But that’s no longer an adequate excuse given what’s at stake – not just a unique American city and cultural treasure, but the shape and structure of the American community in an era of change. Do shrug off these challenges – about which we know a great deal – and consign the vulnerable parts of the country to a slow attrition by disaster? Or do we learn from history, and science, and our own mistakes?

Today’s New York Times Book Review cover piece by Timothy Egan is on Dave Eggers’s new book Zeitoun, a nonfiction narrative of one family’s experience of Hurricane Katrina. So far so good. I haven’t read it yet, but the Eggers book sounds like a fantastic addition to the corpus of Katrina books.

But the review contains a couple of errors. It says the storm hit on Sunday, Aug. 28; actually it made landfall the morning of Aug. 29. Maybe this isn’t a mistake as such – the wind was already blowing pretty hard on Aug. 28. But the second error is significant: “Day 2, the world changes. Zeitoun wakes to a sea of water, after the levees have been overtopped. He’s neck-deep in a city of a thousand acts of desperation.”

As any New Orleans resident will tell you, the levees around central New Orleans, including the area where Zeitoun lives, were never overtopped. Rather, badly-designed floodwalls collapsed and breached in several places before Katrina’s storm surge got anywhere near the top. There was some overtopping in more-exposed areas to the east, but the vast majority of the flooding was caused by those breaches – in other words, human error by the Corps of Engineers.

This is not a minor semantic point. The responsibility for most of the damage to New Orleans and the awful events immediately following the storm lies with the Corps – that is, the federal government. This is not in dispute; three distinct investigations have laid the blame on the Corps, including the Corps’s own study. In any assessment of what happened – scientific, political, historical – this is crux of what went wrong, a terrible failure American know-how whose broader implications are alarming and remain mostly unexamined. New Orleanians and Louisiana politicians and media types do their best to remind the powers that be of these scandalous facts. Harry Shearer has been tireless in making this point. To his credit, Brad Pitt made it on Bill Maher’s HBO show Friday night.

But for some reason, this never quite sunk in with many in the media world, or for that matter the nation as a whole. The shorthand of “New Orleans levees overtopped” – with its underlying associations of “natural disaster swamps city below sea level – what the heck are those people doing living down there?” seems to have been dropped into the review without much thought. I’m assuming that Egan – whose work I like and respect – made the error and not Eggers; but even if it was Eggers, it was up to Egan and his editors not to repeat it in the NYT.

This week’s TPM Cafe Book Club discussion on Cheryl Wagner’s New Orleans memoir Plenty of Suck to Go Around was interesting, and shows that like the proverbial blind men and the elephant, post-Katrina New Orleans is a living, changing, endlessly complex phenomenon not easily reduced to a single idea.

But the common theme is the resilience of people like those Cheryl depicts in the book – including herself – who slog onward, rebuilding their homes, dealing with broken bureaucracies, and sometimes having fun, because, well, this is still New Orleans.

In fact, New Orleans culture seems to have turned out to be more resilient than its own residents may have anticipated. “Suck” does an amusing job of sorting through the overlapping hierarchies of property damage and dedication: people with homes in sodden Mid-City naturally feel some jealousy toward residents of unflooded Uptown neighborhoods, but are also proud of enduring a struggle the Uptown folks can never know. Some people in Cheryl’s cohort of friends and acquaintances take the opportunity to alight for other funky, granola-friendly towns like Austin and Portland, while others double down on the Crescent City. Out of this churn, as Harry Shearer pointed out, New Orleans has seen a renaissance of civic engagement. People actually get up in the morning and think about how to improve community they live in – they have to! Louisiana residents have always taken an outsized interest in politics, but far less in the functioning of government and making things work. Katrina has altered that seemingly unalterable feature of New Orleans civic life.

This is a good thing, obviously, and not just for New Orleans. The city and its environs may be cultural and geographical outliers, but its predicament isn’t really so unique. It’s just on an accelerated timetable. Most of us are accustomed to a degree of environmental stability: summers are hot, winters cold. But that’s starting to change, and as the changes spread we’re going to be seeing more big storms, more floods – and more man-made systems failing. This on top of broader alterations in patterns of rainfall and drought that will affect food production, water consumption. In other words, things are already changing, and those changes will accelerate beyond the capacity of governments to keep pace. As everybody could see from Day 1 in New Orleans, the nation as a whole moves very slowly to address these kinds of threats. We’re likely to stumble from one disaster to another for quite a while.

I think the federal government needs to get out in front of these problems – and New Orleans should be (or ought to have been) the ideal opportunity to do so. But if that’s not going to happen, the kinds of resourcefulness and community-building we see in Cheryl’s book will provide a good model of its own. There’s no one-size-fits all solution for a lot of the problems we face, and many solutions will be local, and flexible. That doesn’t excuse the nation from shirking the challenges of climate change, but the example of New Orleans does offer some rays of hope.

Sorry for the long interregnum between postings. I got caught up in, you know, actual paying work for a while. And as others have discovered, Twitter tends to supplant blogging. Even before the recent interruption, I found I was blogging less, and my posts were typically longer. That is, they required me to actually make an argument, something you can’t really do effectively on Twitter. I hope there’s a felicitous balance in there somewhere.

Here are a couple of pointers. This week I’m participating in a TPM Cafe Book Club discussion of Cheryl Wagner’s post-Katrina memoir, Plenty of Suck to Go Around. It’s a very good read of the absolutely crazy aftermath of the storm from the street level of house-gutting, subletting, jobless craziness that so many in New Orleans endured and survived. As always, the question for me is, how is New Orleans going to survive a century of global warming without serious hurricane protection, and why can’t the U.S. government actually make that happen? All the valiant struggles of the past four years are at risk.

Last week I had a second piece up on Yale Environment 360 about mountaintop removal coal mining, this one focusing on what science tells us about the ecological effects of blowing up mountains. It may seem obvious that the effects would be devastating, but there are a number of regulatory fig leaves here. Mining operations are supposed to restore mined-out sites to the “approximate original contour” and revegetate them. Under optimal circumstances, they rebuild the mountain and plant trees. But even this responsible approach, which is rare, can’t undo the damage to hydrology and riverine ecosystems that have evolved over millions of years.

The science puts Obama, who has staked his repuation on following science, not politics, in an awkward spot. The EPA and White House want to broker compromises with mining companies to ease the impacts of mountaintop removal – the politically pragmatic approach. But the science is telling them that won’t do much good.

In a comment on the previous post about the AP and media neutrality, Harry Shearer makes an excellent point – that, in addition to the Iraq war runup and political coverage, the media also failed in its post-Katrina coverage:

Framing it as a natural disaster–as opposed to the ‘greatest engineering disaster since Chernobyl’–and further framing it as a basically black tragedy (because the black people in the Dome and Convention Center were easier to reach and tape than the white people stranded on their roofs in St. Bernard Parish–was compounded by media folks patting themselves on the back for their “ballsy’ coverage.

I agree. New Orleans’ post-Katrina trajectory could have been a lot different had the media taken a more aggressive role in reporting what actually happened (a civic/government failure to secure citizens’ safety) as opposed to the misleading shorthand version of it that emerged in the immediate aftermath of the storm (heckuva job, Brownie).

But I’d draw a distinction between the media treatment of post-Katrina New Orleans and the two other examples. Pre-Iraq reporting and campaign coverage are both examples of the successful co-optation and/or exploitation of the mainstream media’s “neutrality” by the Bush-Rove political project. That project turned out to be not just misleading, but substantively disastrous. So the media have deservedly lost credibility along with Bush. And, like Bush, many media outlets won’t acknowledge anything was or is amiss. You can’t be “neutral” if you’re living in a fantasy.

The failure to protect New Orleans is both more profound and literally more dangerous than the Iraq misadventure or the rise of Drudge-style politics. More profound because it was a breakdown at all levels of government that led to the levee failures, and those institutional problems haven’t been fixed. More dangerous because it killed a lot of people, and because more will likely die in the future – in New Orleans and elsewhere – as sea levels rise and storms likely grow more intense. But the media failure to “get” this isn’t so much an failure of neutrality undermined by ideology (though there is an element of that) as it is just general media stupidity and short-sightedness, reflecting American society’s stupidity and short-sightedness. Which is sad, and scary. But maybe some new political leadership can begin to address that problem.

James G. Rickards has an interesting op-ed in today’s Washington Post on the role of financial risk modeling in the banking crisis. This is an important topic on its own, but also has sweeping implications for environmental policy, disaster preparation, and other issues. As he explains it, Wall Street’s financial risk models (known as “value at risk”) aggregate the day-to-day risks of various securities:

What’s left is “net” risk that is then considered in light of historical patterns. The model predicts with 99 percent probability that institutions cannot lose more than a certain amount of money. Institutions compare this “worst case” with their actual capital and, if the amount of capital is greater, sleep soundly at night. Regulators, knowing that the institutions used these models, also slept soundly. As long as capital was greater than the value at risk, institutions were considered sound — and there was no need for hands-on regulation.

But there’s a forest-for-the-trees problem here. Aggregating individual risks is fine in a relatively stable system. But what if the system itself becomes unstable? The risk model will not anticipate it. It’s a familiar problem from complexity science:

Think of a mountainside full of snow. A snowflake falls, an avalanche begins and a village is buried. What caused the catastrophe? The value-at-risk crowd focuses on each snowflake and resulting cause and effect. The complexity theorist studies the mountain. The arrangement of snow is a good example of a highly complex set of interdependent relationships; so complex it is impossible to model. If one snowflake did not set off the avalanche, the next one could, or the one after that. But it’s not about the snowflakes; it’s about the instability of the system. This is why ski patrols throw dynamite down the slopes each day before skiers arrive. They are “regulating” the system so that it does not become unstable.

The more enlightened among the value-at-risk practitioners understand that extreme events occur more frequently than their models predict. So they embellish their models with “fat tails” (upward bends on the wings of the bell curve) and model these tails on historical extremes such as the post-Sept. 11 market reaction. But complex systems are not confined to historical experience. Events of any size are possible, and limited only by the scale of the system itself. Since we have scaled the system to unprecedented size, we should expect catastrophes of unprecedented size as well. We’re in the middle of one such catastrophe, and complexity theory says it will get much worse.

This problem – a reliance on computer modeling that cannot accurately anticipate catastrophe – isn’t restricted to finance. Our society bases all of its policy and financial decisions on such “hard” forecasting numbers. Insurance companies employ risk models to gauge likely hurricane losses. Less sophisticated, but still highly trusted, models were used to construct the pre-Katrina New Orleans levees. They rendered the likelihood of a Katrina-sized storm surge relatively small. Often, models are built on datasets with short histories, put together in times of relative stability. But the capacity for a bigger, systemic event to sweep in and take place is always there – the fact that it is very hard to quantify doesn’t mean it’s not real.

The problem now is that the world – its financial, energy, and food systems and the physical environment itself – are changing rapidly. That means more unexpected events will occur – floods, droughts, shortages, gluts, crashes. Government and private institutions need to recognize that the future won’t be like the past, recognize the limits of their current numbers, and prepare accordingly.

Also: Here’s Nassim Taleb’s take on the same topic.

I have a piece up on the Guardian site with some post-Gustav reflections:

The fact is, due to feedback from human activities, nature has begun to change faster than US government institutions can keep up. There’s a healthy scientific debate over the potential role of global warming in hurricane activity. Some scientists believe a warming atmosphere will lead to more powerful storms. Others say the effects will be minimal. But most everyone agrees that hurricane activity in the Atlantic is in a dangerous, possibly decades-long upswing.

If it is indeed amplified by global warming, we’re going to see some storms unlike any in the past in the coming years. Meanwhile, the lure of living on the coast (and along riverbanks) has put many millions more people in the path of danger, along with their valuable properties, increasing the risk of huge, Katrina-scale losses that will test the insurance industry and the federal government’s budgetary limits.

In order to deal with this, we’re going to have to make some basic changes in how the government operates. Right now, it’s reactive – a major disaster happens (whether a natural catastrophe, or a crash in the financial system, or the food system, or … ) requiring some kind of federal intervention – not just a cleanup operation but some genuine reforms. Congress and the president do something (or not). But I’m guessing that global warming will accelerate the speed at which the environment is changing and quickly outpace all the systems we have in place to make sure people can go on living their lives. We’ll need a government that processes information faster, and acts more quickly.

There’s a new paper out in Nature that adds yet another layer to the debate about global warming and hurricanes (the umbrella term is tropical cyclones). Scientists, including James Elsner at FSU, studied wind speeds in cyclones around the world since 1981, and concluded that the top speeds of the largest storms had increased significantly:

Although there was hardly any increase in the average number or intensity of all storms, the team found a significant shift in distribution towards stronger storms that wreak the greatest havoc. This meant that, overall, there were more storms with a maximum wind speed exceeding 210 kilometres per hour (category 4 and 5 storms on the Saffir–Simpson scale).

This is in keeping with the work of MIT’s Kerry Emanuel and other scientists – many of them using atmospheric computer models – who believe that a warming atmosphere and warming ocean temperatures will result in greater heat-dissipation potential in large storms. This study is significant because it focused on past storms. It’s based on a statistical analysis of satellite data that attempts to smooth out irregularities in measurement caused by varying technologies and techniques around the world. That’s made it hard, for example, to compare trends in the Atlantic basin, where storms have been very carefully monitored for decades, with those of the South Pacific, where government agencies and scientists have been playing catchup.

So: this study, based on hard data, suggests a climate signal already out there, operating now.

This will give some skeptics in this debate pause – many of them are data-driven meteorologists who think that natural cycles and atmospheric effects such as wind shear – sharp differences in wind speeds that can shear off the tops of cyclones – are what really determine the strength of major storms. But the most prominent of these critics, Christopher Landsea, remains, well, skeptical:

Christopher W. Landsea, a science and operations manager at the National Hurricane Center in Miami who has been skeptical of the connection, said the statistical methodology in the new study was excellent, but questioned the underlying data, particularly corrections for data over the Indian Ocean prior to 1997 when there were fewer satellites observing the storms.

Dr. Landsea also said that the increase in Atlantic hurricanes arose from natural variations when decades of active hurricane seasons are followed by decades with few hurricanes. The current period of active hurricane seasons began around 1995.

“The paper has some elegantly calculated statistics, but these are generated on data that are not, in my opinion, reliable for examining how the strongest tropical cyclones have changed around the world,” Dr. Landsea said.

So the debate continues. But this is a provocative addition to it.

A few thoughts on the third anniversary of Hurricane Katrina.

Republicans are feeling a bit panicked about T.S. Gustav, which is expected to strengthen into a Category 4 storm before it strikes the Gulf coast. (NOAA’s forecast track still has it coming in substantially west of New Orleans, which is good news for the city. Not so good for Acadiana and the delta marshes, which could be badly damaged – something that would, in turn, set back coastal restoration efforts.)

The Republicans ought to worry. The spectacle of George W. Bush, Dick Cheney, funny hats and attacks on Barack Obama won’t look good if juxtaposed against another round of Gulf coast suffering and devastation. So if it comes to that, it might make sense to briefly postpone the convention.

There’s a bigger problem here, though. Republicans do have an image problem. But the reason they have it is because they have a problem with substance. And no one’s addressing that. John McCain has visited New Orleans and expressed his regrets for the Katrina debacle. That’s good. But does he have any idea about what needs to be done to rebuild or protect the city and the Gulf coast? (I can’t find anything on his website, though I may not be looking in the right place.) This is not just about spending, it’s about improving the way the government functions. Prepping for global warming. Looking at scientific evidence and mobilizing institutions to address future threats. My sense is that McCain hasn’t thought seriously about any of these things, nor would he know what to do about them should he become president. Which, in an era of rapid change, is tantamount to moving backwards.

« Previous PageNext Page »

Follow

Get every new post delivered to your Inbox.